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Abstract
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release a fixed amount of river water in exchange for an agreed compensation. We examine
the vulnerability of such commitments to reduced water flows. Among all FWSAs that are
acceptable to riparian countries, we find out the one which is sustainable to the most severe
drought scenarios. The so-called upstream incremental FWSA assigns to each country
its marginal contribution to its followers in the river. Its mirror image, the downstream
incremental FWSA, is not sustainable to reduced flow at the source. We apply our analysis
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1 Introduction
Water scarcity is becoming one of the major challenges worldwide. Because of population and
economic growth, demand for water has tremendously increased. At the same time, water
becomes less available in many parts of the world because of global warming. The higher world
temperatures are expected to increase the hydrological cycle activity, leading to a general change
in precipitation patterns and increase in evapotranspiration (IPCC 2007:7). Many semi-arid
regions (e.g. Mediterranean, western United States, southern Africa and northeast Brazil) will
suffer a decrease in water resources availability due to climate change (Bates et al. 2008).
Moreover, other consequences of global warming such as the more frequent of extreme events
of precipitation and dry periods and the early melting of glaciers would lead to an increase in
the variance of water supply. In the next decades, global warming will not only reduce the
mean flows of water supply but also its variance, especially in regions where water is scarce.
Since at least Hardin (1968) and Ostrom (1990), it has been established that the sustainable
exploitation of common-pool natural resources, such as water, requires cooperation among
users. In practice, users such as farmers, industries, cities or countries, coordinate water
extraction through various arrangement from irrigation communities (Ostrom, 1990), to water
markets (Libecap, 2011) or international river treaties (Dinar, 2008). Those arrangements are
designed by users. They specify water releases and, sometime, payments through monetary
transfers, taxes, prices and subsidies. Examples include international river sharing agreements
in which countries commit to release water in exchange for compensations. For instance,
by the Bishkek Treaty signed in 1998, compensation is paid for Kyrgyztan’s compliance with
release schedules that take into account winter energy needs and Uzbekistan’s and Kazakhstan’s
summer irrigation water demands.
This paper addresses the vulnerability of existing water sharing arrangements to drought
events. More precisely, it considers the problem of sharing water from a river with random
water supplies where riparian countries coordinate water extraction through fixed water sharing
agreements. Those agreements commit upstream countries to release fixed volumes of water in
exchange for compensations by downstream users for any realized water supplies. We analyze
the design of Fixed Water Sharing Agreements (FWSA) by sovereign countries. Countries
agree on water releases and transfers based on their expected welfare before water supplies
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are realized. In case of low water supply, a country might be better off not releasing what it
committed even if it has to renounce the compensation. We examine such defection strategies
in case of droughts, where water supplies are below the long-term mean flow.
Examples of countries defection during droughts have been observed. Dinar et al. (2007)
recorded complaints made during 1950-2005 regarding water sharing issues by states sharing
international rivers. They found that a total of 112 complaints have been recorded regarding
drought and floods between 1950-2005. One hundred and six of them regarding droughts and
6 regarding floods. In the Jordan River, while the Jordan-Israel water treaty of 1994 has
mechanisms for dealing with shortages that cover a significant range of possible shortages,
there is no stated mechanism for sharing shortages, mainly in prolonged droughts and extreme
shortages, when they occur. This was the case in the 1998-2000 drought. Israel stated that it
would not be possible to allow Jordan its water allocation according to the agreement, and it
would have to reduce it.
Our framework is an extension of the river sharing problem introduced by Ambec and
Sprumont (2002) to random water flows (see also Ambec and Ehlers 2008). We first study
a cooperative game in which countries negotiate FWSAs based on expected water flows. In
a negotiation among sovereign countries, the agreement should be accepted in a voluntary
manner. In particular, countries are free to reject any water sharing agreement at the basin-
wide level if they are better off signing agreements with a partial number of the basin riparians.
To be accepted by all countries, the FWSA should make any group of countries better-off in
terms of their expectations compared with any other partial agreement (including no agreement
at all). In other words, the FWSA should be in the core of the cooperative game associated
with the river sharing problem.
We first show that the cooperative game generated by the river sharing problem is convex.
It implies that many river sharing agreements are in the core. One of them is the so-called
downstream incremental FWSA introduced by Ambec and Sprumont (2002). It assigns to
any country its marginal contribution to the set of predecessors in the river. By doing so, it
maximizes lexicographically the welfare of the most downstream countries in the river in the set
of core FWSAs. It thus favors downstream countries against upstream countries. We consider
the FWSA opposite to the downstream incremental in the core: the upstream incremental
FWSA. It assigns to each country its marginal contribution to its followers in the river.
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We then examine the vulnerability of core FWSAs to defection in case of drought. A FWSA
agreement specifies some amount of water to be released in exchange for monetary transfers.
With water flows lower than the mean, a country is obliged to consume less than its water
allocation under the FWSA in order to fulfill its commitment. Yet the payment it receives
from the volume of water released is unchanged. With water being more valued by countries in
case of drought, a country might be better off by not releasing the volume of water it committed,
although at a cost of not getting the monetary transfer from downstream countries. For a given
level of reduced flow, a FWSA is sustainable to some reduced water flows if no country chooses
to defect by not releasing water. Among all core FWSAs, the upstream incremental FWSA is
the most sustainable one in the sense that it maximizes the range of reduced flows for which
no country defects. By maximizing payment for water released, it avoids defection in case
of drought as much as possible. In contrast, since it assigns the lowest payment for water
released, the downstream incremental FWSA is the less sustainable core FWSA. It is indeed
not sustainable to drought for the first country in the river.
The economic literature includes several works that focus on various aspects of international
water sharing issues and their stability in a basin setting. Several studies analyze river sharing
agreements but with deterministic water flows (Ambec and Sprumont, 2002; Ambec and Ehlers,
2008, Wang, 2011, Ansink and Weikard, forthcoming). Yet, others introduce the water supply
variability into their analysis. Kilgour and Dinar (2001) review several sharing rules that are
common in international water treaties and demonstrate how they may not meet the treaty
parameters under increased water variability. Alternative sharing rules are suggested and
their sustainability is demonstrated, using the case of the annual flow of the Ganges River at
Farakka, the flash point between India and Bangladesh. Focussing on interstate river compacts
in the United States, Bennett et al. (2000) compare the efficiency of fixed versus proportional
allocation of water with variable water flow in inter-state water compacts. They compute the
optimal fixed water allocation taking into account flow variability, whereas, here we consider
fixed water allocation based on mean flow. They do not address the issue of sustainability in
case of drought, since the federal government has coercive power to enforce interstate compacts.
Ansink and Ruijs (2008) compare the performance of fixed and proportional agreements
regarding their sustainability to reduce water flow. They rely on a two-country repeated game
approach with self-enforcement constraints. Both types of agreements share the same division of
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welfare which translates into a payment from the downstream country to the upstream country.
The authors show that fixed agreements are less sustainable than proportional agreements. Our
paper departs from the last study in two features. First, we do not compare the performance
of different types of agreements with similar exogenous surplus sharing rules (i.e. transfers)
among countries. We rather focus on fixed agreements but endogenize the surplus sharing rule.
We want to identify the surplus sharing rule (or equivalently the transfers among countries)
that is more sustainable to drought. Our paper is thus more on the design of fixed water sharing
agreements than on the comparison of different types of agreements. It aims to recommend
transfers that are less vulnerable to defection in case of drought. Second, we do not restrict
our analysis to bipartite agreements. We consider a river shared by n ≥ 2 countries. By
doing so, we allow for partial agreements in the river basin and coalition deviations during
the negotiation. We also highlight the importance of the spatial structure in a river sharing
problem. As suggested by Dinar (2008), geography is an important aspect that explains many
of the outcomes of treaty stability as affected by water supply variability. We address the
geography aspect in the design of the FWSA.
The paper proceeds as follow. We introduce the model in Section 2. We analyze the design
of river sharing agreements in Section 3. In particular, we define the constrained upstream
incremental river sharing agreement. We show that it is in the core and it is fair. In Section 4,
we study the vulnerability of river sharing agreements to defection in case of drought. We show
that the constrained upstream incremental river sharing agreement is the more sustainable river
sharing agreement among those that are fair and in the core. We then turn to a numerical
application of the Aral Sea and conclude.
2 The river sharing problem
A set N = {1, ..., n} of countries are located along a river and share its water. We identify
countries by their locations along the river and number them from upstream to downstream:
i < j means that i is upstream to j. A coalition of countries is a non-empty subset of N . Given
two coalitions S and T , we write S < T if i < j for all i ∈ S and all j ∈ T . Given a coalition
S, we denote by minS ≡ mini S and maxS ≡ maxi S, respectively, the smallest and largest
members of S, i.e. S = {minS, ...,maxS}. Let Pi = {1, . . . , i} denote the set of predecessors
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of country i and P 0i = Pi\{i} denote the set of strict predecessors of country i. Similarly, let
Fi = {i, i+ 1, . . . , n} denote the set of followers of country i and let F 0i = Fi\{i} denote the
set of strict followers of i. For any n-dimension vector y = (yi)i∈N , we denote by yS = (yi)i∈S
the vector of its components in S for any arbitrary S ⊂ N .
Each country i ∈ N enjoys a benefit bi(xi) from diverting xi units of water from the river.
We assume that the benefit function bi is differentiable, increasing and strictly concave for all
xi > 0. Furthermore, b
′
i(xi) goes to infinity as xi approaches 0. A country also values money
linearly in the sense that the welfare realized by country i with xi units of water and ti units
of money (or welfare or any numerary good) is bi(xi) + ti.
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Each country i ∈ N controls a flow of water ei ≥ 0 with e1 > 0 at the river source. It
includes water supplied by tributaries or stored in a reservoir controlled by i. The controlled
water flows are random. The controlled flow ei ranges in [ei, e¯i] with 0 ≤ ei ≤ e¯i and e1 > 0.
The vector of flows e is distributed according to a density f and cumulative F with f(e) > 0
for every e ∈ ×i∈N [ei, e¯i].
Countries might agree before the realization of e to release some fixed amounts of water in
exchange of some payments. A Fixed Water Sharing Agreement (FWSA) (w, τ ) is a vector of
water releases w and payments τ where wi denotes the amount of water country i commits
to release downstream while τi is the payment received by country i in exchange of wi for
i = 1, .., n. Of course, wn = 0 since the most upstream country has no reason to release water
and, therefore, receives no payment from downstream, i.e. τn = 0. Symmetrically, τ0 = 0 and
w0 = 0 because the most upstream country 1 does not receive water from other countries. For
a realization of ei, the FWSA (w, τ ) allows country i to consume xi = ei + wi−1 − wi units
of water and ti = −τi−1 + τi units of money for every i ∈ N . Given ei, the ex post utility or
welfare of country i with the FWSA (w, τ ) is:
bi(xi) + ti = bi(ei + wi−1 − wi)− τi−1 + τi.
Countries are expected utility maximizers. The ex ante welfare of country i with the FWSA
(w, t) is defined by its expected utility or welfare given the distribution of ei:
E[bi(xi) + ti] = E[bi(xi)] + ti = E[bi(ei + wi−1 − wi)]− τi−1 + τi.
1In other words, the benefit of water consumption is expressed in money.
6
The concavity of bi makes country i dislike the variability of water flow. A river problem with
random water flows is defined by (N, e, b) where e is a random vector of water flows distributed
according to f on ×i∈N [ei, e¯i].
In this setting, non-cooperative water extraction is inefficient. Under laisser-faire, each
country i extracts water flowing down on its territory. Country 1 consumes e1 leaving nothing
to country 2 who itself extracts its controlled water flow and so on. Individual welfare is bi(ei)
ex post and E[bi(ei)] ex ante for every i ∈ N . This outcome is inefficient: the welfare of
two countries i and j with i < j can be improved if country i releases some water to supply
country j in exchange of some transfer.2 In this transferable utility (TU) set-up, efficiency
would require water transfers to maximize total welfare. Moreover, under random water flows,
water transfers should be contingent on realized water flows. Here we don’t allow for such
contingencies. We restrict ourself to ex ante fixed water transfers as it improves welfare in
many cases. Those agreements are widely observed in international rivers. They are also quite
popular in irrigation communities. The fixed nature of water transfers make them vulnerable
to drought.
We first characterize the efficient FWSA at the basin level. Since utility is transferable,
the efficient water releases vector denoted w∗ is uniquely defined as the one that maximizes
total welfare ex ante subject to feasibility constraints. It defines a water consumption vector
x∗ = (x∗)i∈N where x∗i = ei + w
∗
i−1 − w∗i for any realization ei ∈ [ei, e¯i], for every i ∈ N .
Formally, w∗ solves the following maximization program:
maxw E
[∑
i∈N bi(ei + wi−1 − wi)
]
,
subject to
wi ≥ 0 for every i ∈ N,
ei + wi−1 − wi ≥ 0 for every i ∈ N.
The first set of feasibility constraints wi ≥ 0 for every i ∈ N are on water releases: since water
can only be transferred from upstream to downstream water releases cannot be negative. The
second set of feasibility constraints ei + wi−1 − wi ≥ 0 are on water consumption under the
lowest water supply ei. These constraints make sure that consumption xi = ei + wi−1 − wi is
non-negative for any realized water flows ei ∈ [e, e¯i] so that country i will always be able to
2Indeed there exists  > 0 such that bi(ei − ) + bj(ej + ) > bi(ei) + bj(ej). The later condition of welfare
improvement holds in many cases for instances if bi = bj and ei > ej .
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release what it committed to. This constraint should hold for every country i ∈ N . Denoting
µi and λi the Lagrangian multipliers of the first and the second set of feasibility constraints
respectively, the first-order conditions yield:
E[b′i+1(x
∗
i+1)− b′i(x∗i )] = λi − λi+1 − µi,
for i = 1, ..., n− 1. The above conditions implies for any j > i:
E[b′j(x
∗
j )− b′i(x∗i )] = λi − λj −
j∑
l=i
µl, (1)
The first-order conditions prescribe equalizing ex ante marginal benefits of water consumption
whenever it is possible. If not, then one of the constraints is binding. It could be that the non-
negative water release constraint is binding at say i, and, therefore, µi > 0. Or the non-negative
water consumption constraint is binding, in which case λi > 0.
We show that, under infinite marginal benefit at zero water consumption, the non-negative
water consumption constraints are not binding. If it was binding for, say, country j, then
water consumption in case of extreme drought ej would be set to zero for i which implies an
infinite marginal benefit in this case, formally b′j(x
∗
j ) = +∞ where x∗j = ej +w∗j−1 −w∗j . Since
ej occurs with strictly positive probability, it implies that j’s marginal benefit is also infinite
in expectation: E[b′j(x
∗
j )] = +∞. On the other hand, since e1 > 0, at least some country i
consumes water in all states of nature. For this country i, expected marginal benefit is finite:
E[b′i(x
∗
i )] < +∞. The last two conditions on expected marginal benefits for i and j contradicts
the first-order condition (1). We therefore conclude that λi = 0 for every i ∈ N so that the
first-order condition (1) becomes:
E[b′i(x
∗
i )− b′j(x∗j )] =
j∑
l=i
µl, (2)
Ex ante marginal benefits are equalized whenever the non-negative water release constraint is
not binding between i and j. If it is at some location l with i < l < j then µl > 0 which
implies E[b′i(x
∗
i )] > E[b
′
j(x
∗
j )]: country i enjoys a higher ex ante marginal benefit from water
consumption than country j. Moreover, in this case, wl = 0 and, therefore, no water transferred
from i to j. Indeed, binding the constraint at l would imply not releasing water from country
l. It is optimal to do that if water is relatively more abundant downstream l in expectation.
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Since marginal benefits reflect water scarcity in the sense that more water leads to a lower
marginal benefit, ex ante marginal benefit is lower downstream.
Similarly to Ambec and Sprumont (2002) for deterministic water flows e (see also Kilgour
and Dinar, 2002), the best FWSA partitions the set of agents N into consecutive subsets
{Nk}Kk=1 with Nk < Nk+1 for k = 1, ...,K − 1. It defines the ex ante shadow value of water
{βk}Kk=1 at each segment Nk of the river with βk > βk+1. Ex ante marginal benefits from water
consumption are equalized among countries within Nk. They are equal to the ex ante shadow
value of water βk at Nk. Countries in Nk share the water flows they control
∑
i∈Nk ek and,
therefore, do not transfer water downstream of Nk. Ex ante marginal benefit decreases moving
from Nk to Nk+1 as well as the shadow value of water. Formally, the following conditions hold:
Nk < Nk′ and βk > βk′ whenever k < k
′
E[b′i(x
∗
i )] = βk =
∑
j≤i
µj for every i ∈ Nk and k = 1, ...K,
w∗maxNk = 0 for k = 1, ...K.
Having fully described the efficient vector of water releases w∗, we now come back to the design
of the FWSA. We consider the following timing for the design and compliance to a FWSA.
1. Countries agree on a FWSA (w, τ ).
2. Water flows e are realized.
3. Each country decides to comply or not with the FWSA.
We first model the negotiation among countries on a FWSA as a cooperative game. We do
not impose any structure on the bargaining game. Instead we assign minimal restrictions on
the outcome of the negotiation given by the bargaining power of countries represented by their
worth. The worth of a coalition of countries is the welfare that the coalition can secure by itself
(i.e. by leaving the negotiation). A FWSA at the basin level should at least assign its worth to
any coalition of countries. Otherwise, a coalition would block the FWSA, objecting that it can
achieve a higher welfare on its own. In the next section, we describe the set of core FWSAs
defined as FWSAs that are not blocked by any coalition. We then discuss the emergence of
some of the core FWSAs in specific non-cooperative bargaining games or water markets.
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3 The design of FWSAs
When leaving the negotiation for a basin-wide FWSA, a coalition S ⊂ N can still rely on its
controlled water flows eS = (ei)i∈S . The welfare that coalition S can secure is the highest
welfare achieved by designing a partial FWSA (wS , τS) among the members of S. Denoted
v(S), the worth of a coalition S can easily be defined for a connected coalition. A coalition S
is connected if for all i, j ∈ S and all k ∈ N , i < k < j implies k ∈ S. For a connected coalition
S,
v(S) = maxwS E
[∑
i∈S bi(ei + wi−1 − wi)
]
,
subject to
wi ≥ 0 for every i ∈ S,
ei + wi−1 − wi ≥ 0 for every i ∈ S,
(3)
where wminS−1 = 0. In particular, the stand-alone welfare of country i is simply v({i}) =
E[bi(ei)]. Let us denote by w
S
S the solution to (3). It is the efficient vector of water releases of
the reduced game (S, eS , bS).
For a disconnected coalition, we first need to decompose the coalition into its connected
components. Let P(S) = {Sl}Ll=1 be the unique partition of S into its connected components.
Since water cannot be transferred between two components Sl and Sl+1 of P(S), the worth of
coalition S is obtained by summing up the worth of its connected components:
v(S) =
∑
Sl∈P(S)
v(Sl), (4)
where v(Sl) is given by (10). A FWSA (w, τ ) is not blocked by coalition S ⊂ N if∑
i∈S
(E [bi(ei + wi−1 − wi)]− τi−1 + τi) ≥ v(S). (5)
We say that a FWSA is in the core of the cooperative game generated by the problem (N, b, e)
if the no-blocking condition (5) holds for every S ⊂ N . We call v(S) the core lower bound for
coalition S for every S ⊂ N .
Clearly, the core lower bound for the “grand coalition” N forces the FWSA to be efficient.
Indeed, since v(N) =
∑
i∈N E[bi(x
∗
i )] =
∑
i∈N E[bi(ei + w
∗
i−1 − w∗i )], the core lower bounds
determine fully water releases to w = w∗. Monetary transfers τ still need to be defined. To
do so, it is convenient to work with welfare distributions instead of payments. Let us define
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u = (ui)i∈N a distribution of the total ex ante welfare v(N) with
∑
i∈N ui = v(N). There is a
mapping between welfare distributions and transfers. To a given transfer scheme τ corresponds
a unique distribution of the welfare u where u1 = E[b1(x
∗
1)] + τ1, ui = E[bi(x
∗
i )] − τi−1 + τi
for i = 2, ..., n − 1 and un = E[bn(x∗n)] − τn−1. Hence, from the welfare distribution u with∑
i∈N ui = v(N), one can compute the monetary transfers defined as τi =
∑
j≤i(ui−E[bj(x∗j )])
for i = 1, ..., n− 1.
We will say that a welfare distribution u satisfies the core lower bounds if for every S ⊂ N :∑
i∈S
ui ≥ v(S).
A welfare distribution that satisfies the core lower bounds is called a core welfare distribution.
We now establish a useful property of the characteristic function v, namely its convexity. The
proof is in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 The cooperative game v is convex in the sense that v(S) − v(S\i) ≥ v(T ) −
v(T\i) for every i ∈ T ⊂ S ⊂ N .
The above proposition allows us to describe the full set of core welfare distributions. Shapley
(1971) has shown that the core of a convex game is the convex hull of the so-called marginal
contribution vectors. A marginal contribution vector assigns to each agent its marginal contri-
bution to the coalition composed by its strict predecessors in a specific ordering of all agents.
Let us define such an ordering by γ which is a bijection from N to N . The vector of marginal
contributions of the ordering γ assigns ui = v(Pγ(i)) − v(P 0γ(i)) to agent i for i = 1, ..., n.
All these marginal contribution vectors are in the core. Moreover, the core contains all linear
combinations of marginal contribution vectors. One example is the Shapley value which assigns
to every agent i its marginal contribution to all possible orderings weighted by the probability
of such an ordering. It is indeed the barycenter of the core. An other interesting element of the
core is the so-called downstream incremental distribution proposed by Ambec and Sprumont
(2002). Denoted ud, it considers the natural ordering along the river γ(i) = i. It assigns to
any country i its marginal contribution to the coalition composed by its predecessors along the
river: udi = v(Pi)− v(P 0i) for i = 1, ..., n. It is the unique welfare distribution in the core that
maximizes lexicographically the welfare of the most downstream users n, n−1, ..., 1. Given the
above definition of udi for every i ∈ N , the upstream incremental distribution determines the
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payments for water releases τdi for every i ∈ N as:
τdi = v(Pi)− E
∑
j∈Pi
bj(ej + w
∗
j−1 − w∗j )
 . (6)
Payments are based on losses for upstream countries. The compensation paid by country i+ 1
to country i is the expected loss from releasing w∗i units of water at i for all upstream countries.
The welfare distribution opposite to the downstream incremental in the core is the upstream
incremental distribution. It considers the reverse ordering of agents γ(i) = n − i. Defined
as uui = v(Fi) − v(F 0i) for i = 1, ..., n, it assigns to country i its marginal contribution
to its successors along the river. The upstream incremental distribution is the core welfare
distribution that maximizes lexicographically the welfare of the most upstream agents 1, 2, ...n.
The upstream incremental distribution determines the payments for water releases τui for every
i ∈ N :
τui = E
∑
j∈F 0i
bj(ej + w
∗
j−1 − w∗j )
− v(F 0i). (7)
Payments are based on gains for downstream countries. The compensation paid by country
i+ 1 to country i is the expected gain from releasing w∗i units of water at i for all downstream
countries.
Although we did not put any structure in the bargaining game when deriving the above
welfare distribution solutions, it is easy to show that they might emerge as an outcome of
particular non-cooperative game. Consider for instance water trading among countries in which
most upstream countries have bargaining power. More precisely, supposer that country 1
makes a take-it-or-leave-it water trade offer (w1, τ1) to country 2 who then does the same
to country 3 and so on up to country n. Then backward induction shows that subgame
perfect equilibrium share welfare according to the upstream incremental distribution. The most
downstream country n would accepts any water release wn−1 and payment τn−1 that yields its
at least its stand alone ex ante welfare v(n).3 To maximize its ex ante welfare, country n − 1
would leave country n on its participation constraint and, therefore assigns exactly v(n) to n.
Now move backward to the bargaining between country n− 2 and n− 1. Country n− 1 would
accept any water release wn−2 and payment τn−2 that assigns at least what it would get by
3v(n) is a slight abuse of the notation v({n}) which is the worth of coalition {n}.
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itself while bargaining with country n, that is v(n− 1, n)− v(n). Country n− 2 leaves country
n− 1 on its participation constraint by assigning v(n− 1, n)− v(n) to n− 1. Doing so country
n − 2 achieves at least v(n − 2, n − 1, n) − v(n − 1, n) which is its outside option if it refuses
an offer to country n− 3. Moving backward again and gain leads to the upstream incremental
distribution as an outcome of the subgame perfect payoffs of the bargaining game.4
A similar argument holds if bargaining power is assigned to downstream countries during
bilateral trades. Suppose that country n makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to country n − 2
who them makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to country n− 3 and so on up to country 1. Then,
by backward induction, one can easily show that subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs share
the total welfare v(N) according to the downstream incremental distribution. At the last
bargaining stage, country 1 accepts any offer w1 and τ1 from country 2 assigning itself at least
v(1). Given that, country 2 would leave exactly v(1) to country 1. It would accept any w2 and
t2 from country 3 that assigns at least v(1, 2) − v(1) and so on. The arguments follows up to
country n.
Which bargaining structure seems most natural here is debatable.5 In particular, being
upstream does not necessarily provide more bargaining power. Downstream users might have
access to other tributaries or storage facilities located within their territories. They might also
be able to value water more efficiently through irrigation and hydropower infrastructures. All
these elements are embedded in the ei parameters and bi functions which determine the outside
option of countries. Although downstream countries demand water, upstream countries need
the payment from downstream countries to be able to extract more from water management.
During the negotiation among two countries, there is no clear justification for assuming more
bargaining power to the one who provides water (upstream) rather than the one who provides
money (downstream).
A last solution is the welfare distribution that emerges if countries are assigned property
rights on their control flows e and exchange water in a competitive market. Let us call it
the Walrasian welfare distribution. It relies on the assumption of price-taker countries which,
therefore, have limited bargaining power when they decide how much to buy upstream and how
4Notice that it implies that not only transfers tu are implemented but also efficient water releases w∗.
5On this issue, Van der Brink and al. (2007) criticize the downstream incremental distribution for not giving
“any incentive to a player i to cooperate with its successors.”
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much to release downstream. The Walrasian welfare distribution and corresponding Walrasian
FWSA (w∗, τw) assigns ui = E[bi(e∗i + w
∗
i−1 − w∗i )] + βk(w∗i−1 − w∗i ) to every country i ∈ Tk
for k = 1, ...,K. It decomposes the river into K local markets for water where βk is the price
of water at Tk for k = 1, ...,K. Country i ∈ Tk buys w∗i−1 units of water to country i− 1 and
sells w∗i units of water to country i at price βk. It thus pays τ
w
i−1 = βkw
∗
i−1 to country i−1 and
receives τwi = βkw
∗
i from country i. Notice that if i − 1 ∈ Tk−1 then w∗i−1 = 0 and country i
does not buy water to country i− 1. Similarly, if i ∈ Tk+1 then w∗i = 0 and country i does not
sell water to country i + 1. Notice that, under deterministic water flows, Wang (2011) shows
that bilateral trading among price-takers countries leads to the Walrasian welfare distribution.
4 Sustainable FWSAs
We examine compliance with FWSAs. By signing an FWSA (w, τ ), countries commit to
release water against money independently of the realized water flows. For some realized
water flow, some countries might be tempted not to fulfill their obligations. Indeed, even if
signing a FWSA is welfare increasing ex ante, ex post some countries might be better off not
not complying with the FWSA. First, a country might be better off not releasing what it
committed to the next downstream country. Second, a country might be better off not buying
the water it committed to the next upstream country. The former defection arises with lower
water flows than expected whereas the later is tempting when water is more abundant than
expected. We focus on defection in case of drought as defined below.
Definition 1 An FWSA (w, τ ) is sustainable to reduced flow ei ≤ E[ei] if:
bi(ei + wi−1 − wi) + τi − τi−1 ≥ bi(ei + wi−1)− τi−1.
The above no-defection constraints insures that country i is better-off by releasing wi rather
than consuming all water. The no-defection constraint for country i and realized flow ei sim-
plifies to,
τi ≥ bi(ei + wi−1)− bi(ei + wi−1 − wi). (8)
The transfer paid for wi should not exceed the relative value of wi for country i for any realized
water flow. Since the left-hand side is decreasing with ei, one need to consider only the lowest
water flow ei to asses the sustainability of a FWSA.
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Definition 2 An FWSA (w, τ ) is sustainable if
τi ≥ bi(ei + wi−1)− bi(ei + wi−1 − wi) for every i ∈ N.
We are now able to establish the main result of the paper. It characterizes the upstream
incremental FWSA as the (unique) core FWSA that is the most sustainable to drought (the
proof is in appendix).
Proposition 2 The upstream incremental FWSA (w∗, τu) is the most sustainable FWSA in
the sense that it is sustainable to more severe droughts than any other core FWSA.
Proposition 2 allows us to determine the minimal flow of water such that a FWSA might
be sustainable. It implies that, if a realized water flow is not sustainable under the FWSA, no
FWSA is sustainable. Combining the definition of τui in (7) with the no-defection constraint
(8) defines the minimal flow e˜i such that (w
∗, τu) is sustainable:
bi(e˜i)− bi(e˜i + w∗i−1 − w∗i ) =
∑
j∈F 0i
E
[
bj(x
∗
j )
]− v(F 0i) (9)
We thus obtain the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 A FWSA can be made sustainable if and only if ei ≥ e˜i for every i ∈ N .
In the particular case where ei ≥ e˜i for every i ∈ N then, among all the core FWSA, only
the upstream incremental FWSA is sustainable. The minimal flow e˜i for i = 1, ..., n is a
measure of sustainability for FWSAs. It indicates weather compliance in case of drought is
a serious issue or not. If it is, the upstream incremental FWSA should be selected. If not,
other FWSAs might be sustainable. Therefore, other considerations such as fairness concerns
might be invoked to selected a FWSA among those who satisfy the core lower bounds. For
instance, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) proposes a fairness criteria called the aspiration welfare
upper bounds that selects the downstream incremental FWSA under deterministic flows. Under
random water flows, the next proposition shows that the downstream incremental FWSA is
not a good candidate among all core FWSAs to insure sustainability (the proof is in appendix).
Proposition 3 The downstream incremental FWSA (w∗, τ d) is the less sustainable FWSA
in the sense that all other core FWSAs are sustainable to more severe droughts. It is not
sustainable to reduced flow at the source.
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Proposition 3 provides another characterization of the downstream incremental FWSA: among
all core FWSA, it is the less sustainable one. Since the downstream incremental FWSA is the
only FWSA that satisfies the core lower bounds the fairness (aspiration welfare) upper bounds,
Proposition 3 implies that, with random water flows, no core FWSA is fair and sustainable to
drought.
5 Application to the Aral Sea Basin
We illustrate our approach with a simple example of 3 players, calibrated to the Aral Sea basin.
More precisely, we focus on the Bishkek international agreement signed in 1998 by Kyrgyzstan
(KG), Uzbekistan (UZ) and Kazakhstan (KZ) on the Syr Darya river. The Syr Darya is one of
the main streams that create the Aral Sea Basin in Central Asia. A description of the various
features of the Syr Darya River, within the Aral Sea Basin are provided in Dinar et al, (2007).
Dukhovny and de Schutter (2011) estimate the total annual river runoff between 1951-1975 to
be 37.2 km3. Of that volume, the runoff formed within KG, UZ and KZ is 74.2, 16.6, and
6.5 percent, respectively. Tajikistan contributes a miniscule amount of 2.7 percent, and for
practical purposes it is not considered a riparian to this river. KG is the upstream riparian,
using the water for electricity generation. UZ and KZ are both downstream riparians that use
the water for irrigation of field crops (mainly wheat and cotton). The heart of the conflict
between the three riparians stems from the reciprocal need-period of water for production of
electricity (winter) and irrigation (summer). These conflicts are exacerbated by two factors
related to climate change, namely variation in water availability across years, and extreme
temperature low values in winter experienced by the upstream riparian KG. After several
conflict incidents that followed the 1991 Soviet Union collapse the riparian states reached several
agreements, including the 1998 Bishkek Barter Agreement. Without entering the agreement
features and usefulness, the barter details (Dinar et al., 2007) suggest that KG receives from
KZ the equivalent of 1.1 billion kWh of electric power in the form of coal (valued at 22 million
dollars) and 400 million kWh + 500 million m3 of natural gas (valued at 48.5 million dollars)
from UZ. In return, KG releases 3.25 billion m3 of water from the Toktogul Reservoir in
monthly flows during the irrigation season and 2.2 billion kWh of summer electricity (from its
hydropower facility on the Toktogul reservoir and downstream cascade) to KZ and UZ. Water
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release in summer was renegotiated to 1.3 billion m3 in 2000 and 2.5 billion m3 in 2001.6 The
2000 agreement specifies that the summer water release should be allocated equally between
KZ and UZ.
Using an integrated hydrologic-agronomic-economic model of the Syr Darya basin (Cai,
McKinney and Lasdon, 2003), we estimated a quadratic water benefit function for each of the
three countries. Releasing D1 billion cubic meters from the Toktogul Reservoir allows KG to
produce hydropower with an estimated benefit of B1(D1) = 10.9D1 − 0.032D21 in millions of
dollars. From the D1 billion m3 released by KG, let us denote UZ and KZ’s water consumption
in billion m3 by D2 and D3 respectively with D2+D3 = D1. The agricultural benefit from KG’s
water releases is B2(D2) = 12.749+538D2−22D22 for UZ and B3(D3) = 3.148+540D3−23D23
for KZ. The intercepts 12.749 and 3.148 represent the value of crop produced with the water
inflows controlled by UZ and KZ, respectively. Under the above benefit functions, we estimate
the upstream and downstream incremental transfers paid to KG for the 1998, 2000 and 2001
agreements. Consistent with theory, under the downstream incremental transfer td, the most
upstream country is compensated exactly for its loss of welfare. That means that KG is paid for
the loss of hydropower in winter due to water release in summer. The transfer td is thus defined
as the expected loss of welfare for KG due to summer water releases. If KG has to release 3.25
billion m3 in summer in compliance with the 1998 agreement, then the downstream incremental
transfer is the difference between the expected value of hydropower production with and without
3.25 billions m3.7 Symmetrically, the upstream incremental transfer is the increased welfare
due to summer water releases in UZ and KZ. Since the intercept evaluates the benefit without
(summer) water releases, it is simply the difference between the benefit with 3.25/2 = 1.625
billion m3 and the intercept for each country.8 We sum up the two differences to obtain the
transfer received by KG under the upstream incremental distribution. The estimated transfers
are presented in Table 1 below.
6Sources: www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/mckinney/papers/aral/central asia regional water.htm and
www.cawater-info.net/bk/water law/part3 e.htm
7More precisely, we compute the expected benefits E[B1(D1)] with water releases D1 corresponding to the
water inflows described in Table 2 (with the probabilities computed in the first column) and the expected benefit
with the same water releases minus 3.25 billion m3.
8Consistently with the 2000 agreement, water released by KG D1 is shared equally between UZ and KZ:
D2 = D3 = D1/2. It is also approximatively the optimal split of D1 given UZ’s and KZ’s benefit functions.
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Date Delivery td tu
in billion m3 in million $ in million $
1998 3.25 33.3 1633
2000 1.3 13.2 682
2001 2.5 25.5 1277
Table 1: Water and monetary transfers
Our Aral Sea basin example illustrates the magnitude of the difference between the two solu-
tions. It also suggests that the range of acceptable transfers defined as [tu, td] is quite significant.
The transfer negotiated in the 1998 agreement which is 22 + 48.5 = 70.5 million dollars, turns
out to be included in this range. In Table 2 below, we compute the loss of welfare for all water
inflows under the agreements signed in 1998, 2000 and 2001. That is the difference between
B1(q) and B1(q − R) for any realized water inflows q under the committed release R with
R = 3250 for 1998, R = 1300 for 2000 and R = 2500 for 2001.
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Probability Water Inflow q Loss 1998 Loss 2000 Loss 2001
of higher inflow in million m3 agreement agreement agreement
P (Q > q) in million $ in million $ in million $
0.990 6525 34.4 13.7 26.4
0.980 7478 34.2 13.6 26.3
0.970 7750 34.2 13.6 26.2
0.945 8290 34.0 13.5 26.1
0.895 8810 33.9 13.5 26.0
0.830 9232 33.8 13.5 26.0
0.780 9714 33.7 13.4 25.9
0.720 10267 33.6 13.4 25.8
0.605 10763 33.5 13.3 25.7
0.495 11286 33.4 13.3 25.6
0.430 11746 33.3 13.2 25.6
0.390 12130 33.2 13.2 25.5
0.330 12755 33.1 13.2 25.4
0.260 13207 33.0 13.1 25.3
0.210 13686 32.9 13.1 25.3
0.165 14329 32.8 13.0 25.2
0.110 14702 32.7 13.0 25.1
0.065 15152 32.6 13.0 25.0
0.050 15763 32.5 12.9 24.9
0.041 16250 32.4 12.9 24.9
0.035 16590 32.3 12.8 24.8
0.030 17250 32.2 12.8 24.7
0.027 17750 32.1 12.7 24.6
0.023 18250 32.0 12.7 24.5
0.020 18754 31.9 12.7 24.4
0.017 19250 31.8 12.6 24.4
0.015 19750 31.7 12.6 24.3
0.010 20725 31.5 12.5 24.1
Table 2: Loss of welfare due to water release depending on water inflow
under the three agreements
As expected, the loss of benefit is increasing with a decline in water inflow. For a given
inflow q, KR is better-off defecting if the loss of benefit from releasing water is higher than
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the transfer it receives. Consider the two transfers td and tu computed in Table 1. None of
the agreement would be sustainable with the transfer td when inflow is lower than 11 billions
m3 (approximately) which occurs 40% of the time. However, all agreements are sustainable
with tu for any potential inflow according to our estimations. Furthermore, the 70.5 million
dollars compensation for KG stipulated from the 1998 agreement seems also to prevent KG
from defecting for any realized inflow.
6 Conclusion
By signing international river sharing treaties voluntarily, countries agree to release some fixed
amount of water in exchange for some compensation. They have a self-interest in complying
with the releases when water inflow is high enough. Even if an agreement specifies water supply
to downstream countries, a country is better off by releasing what it had committed to, since
the payment it receives from downstream countries offset its welfare loss from releasing water.
This is not always the case under water drought conditions within its territory. To release the
same amount of water, the country is obliged to consume less water. It might be tempted to
defect if the payment ir receives does not compensate its welfare loss from releasing the water.
In this paper, we analyze the design of fixed water sharing agreements under variable
water flow and their robustness to the above defection strategy by countries. We first fully
characterize the set of agreements that are acceptable by all groups of riparian countries. They
all prescribe the same water releases: those which maximize the expected welfare of water
extraction along the river. In contrast, many monetary transfers can be part of an acceptable
water agreement including the ones defined by the Shapley value, the Walrasian allocation
and the downstream incremental welfare distribution. They might emerge from a negotiation
process among countries.
Among the set of acceptable monetary transfers, we identify the one which is the most robust
to defection in case of drought. It is the upstream incremental transfer scheme which requires
that each country receives the marginal contribution of its water releases to all the countries
located downstream. It maximizes lexicographically the welfare of the most upstream countries
in the set of acceptable transfers. Opposite in this set is the downstream incremental transfer
scheme which maximizes lexicographically the welfare of the most downstream countries. The
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downstream incremental transfer scheme turns out to be less robust to defection than any
other acceptable transfer scheme. Our computation from a simple representation of the Aral
Sea basin provides evidence that the two types of solutions can differ substantially. It thus
suggests that picking the right agreement can greatly reduce the vulnerability of fixed water
sharing agreements to global warming.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
The proof generalizes Ambec and Sprumont (2000) to random water flows. For any coalition
S, let wSS denote the water releases solution to the program (3) defined by v(S). We use the
following notation: for any two coalitions R and S, R < T (resp. R > T ) means R is strictly
upstream (resp. strictly downstream) S in the sense that j < i (resp. j > i) for any j ∈ R and
i ∈ S. We first proof the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 For any two connected coalitions T, S with T ⊂ S,
(a) If S\T < T , wSj ≥ wTj and xSj ≥ xTj for every ej ∈ [ej , e¯j ], for every j ∈ T .
(b) If S\T > T , wSj ≤ wTj and xSj ≤ xTj for every ej ∈ [ej , e¯j ], for every for every j ∈ T .
We first prove (a). Let t = minT ≡ mini∈T T . First, remark that wST is solution to the program
maxwT E[bt(et + w
S
t−1 − wt)] + E
[∑
i∈T\t bi(ei + wi−1 − wi)
]
,
subject to
wi ≥ 0 for every i ∈ T,
et + w
S
t−1 − wt ≥ 0,
ei + wi−1 − wi ≥ 0 for every i ∈ T\t.
(10)
The solution of the above program wST is the best vector of water releases in the reduced game
(T, e′T , bT ) where e
′
t = et + w
S
t−1 and e′j = ej for every j ∈ T\t. The first-order conditions of
the program (10) imply for every j ∈ T , j > t:
E[b′t(et + w
S
t−1 − wSt )] ≥ E[b′j(ej + wSj−1 − wSj )], (11)
Similarly, wTT is the best vector of water releases of the reduced game (T, eT , bT ). Therefore,
the first-order conditions of the program defined by v(T ) imply that ∃l ∈ T such that for every
j : t < j < l:
E[b′t(et − wTt )] = E[bj(ej + wTj−1 − wTj )] = E[bl(el + wTl−1)]. (12)
Suppose that wSt < w
T
t . We show that w
S
j < w
T
j for every j : t < j ≤ l. Since et+wSt−1−wSt >
et − wTt for every et ∈ [et, e¯t], E[b′t(et + wSt−1 − wSt )] < E[b′t(et − wTt )] by concavity of bt.
By (12) and (11) for j = t + 1, the last inequality implies E[b′t+1(et+1 + wSt − wSt+1)] <
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E[b′t+1(et+1 +wTt −wTt+1)]. Now because et+1 +wSt < et+1 +wTt for every et+1 ∈ [et+1, e¯t+1], for
the previous inequality to hold, we must have wSt+1 > w
T
t+1. Proceeding the same argument for
t+ 1, t+ 2, .. up to l− 1 shows that if wSt < wTt then wSj < wTj for j = t+ 1, t+ 2, ..., l− 1. Now
we have wSl−1 < w
S
l−1 implies el + w
S
l−1 < el + w
T
l for every el ∈ [el, e¯l] which, in turn, implies
el+w
S
l−1−wSl < el+wTl for every el ∈ [el, e¯l]. Therefore E[b′l(el+wSl−1−wSl )] > E[b′l(el+wTl−1)].
Combining the last inequality with (12) and (11) contradicts our starting assumption that
E[b′t(et + wSt−1 − wSt )] < E[b′t(et − wTt )]. Therefore wSt ≥ wTt . The same arguments show that
wSi ≥ wTi for i = t+ 1, t+ 2, ...,maxT .
Now we prove xSj ≥ xTj for every ej ∈ [ej , e¯j ], for every j ∈ T . First, note that since wSmaxT ≥
wTmaxT , x
S
maxT = emaxT +w
S
maxT ≥ emaxT +wTmaxT for every emaxT ∈ [emaxT , e¯maxT ]. Therefore
all we need to show is: xSk ≥ xTk implies xSk−1 ≥ xTk−1 for an arbitrary k ∈ T\minT . Assume
xSk ≥ xTk . By concavity of bk, E[b′k(xSk )] ≤ E[b′k(xTk )]. If wSk−1 > 0 then the first-order conditions
of the maximization program defined by v(S) and v(T ) imply E[b′k−1(x
S
k−1)] = E[b
′
k(x
S
k )] and
E[b′k−1(x
T
k−1)] ≥ E[b′k(xTk )] respectively. The last three inequalities imply E[b′k−1(xSk−1)] ≤
E[b′k−1(x
T
k−1)] which, in turns, imply x
S
k−1 ≥ xTk−1 for every ek−1 ∈ [ek−1, e¯k−1]. Now if
wSk−1 = 0, then w
T
k−1 = 0 because w
S
k−1 ≥ wTk−1. In this case, xSk−1 = ek−1+wSk−2 ≥ ek−1+wTk−2
for every ek−1 ∈ [ek−1, e¯k−1] because wSk−2 ≥ wTk−2.
The Proof of (b) proceeds similarly, starting with maxT instead of minT .
We are now ready to proof Proposition 1. Fix i ∈ T ⊂ S ⊂ N . Let R be the (unique)
connected sub-coalition of T containing i and let Q be the (unique) coalition in S containing
i. Note that R ⊂ Q. Given (4), all we need to show is:
v(R)− v(R\i) ≤ v(Q)− v(Q\i). (13)
Let Rp ≡ R ∩ P 0i, RF ≡ R ∩ F 0i, and define QP and QF similarly. Note that v(R\i) =
v(RP ) + v(RF ) and v(Q\i) = v(QP ) + v(QF ). Moreover, RP ⊂ QP , RF ⊂ QF , and R, RP , RF
as well as Q, QP , QF are connected.
Step 1 We show that:
v(RP ∪ i)− v(RP ) ≤ v(QP ∪ i)− v(QP ), (14)
v(RF ∪ i)− v(RF ) ≤ v(QF ∪ i)− v(QF ). (15)
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Let dj = w
RP
j − wRP∪ij for each j ∈ RP \i − 1 where wRPRP and w
RP∪i
RP∪i are the best fixed water
releases vectors for coalitions RP and RP ∪ i respectively. This quantity is nonnegative because
of Lemma 1. Since
∑
j∈RP dj =
∑
j∈RP w
RP∪i
j = w
RP∪i
i−1 , by definition,
v(RP ∪ i)− v(RP ) =
∑
j∈RP
(
E[bj(x
RP
j − dj−1 + dj)]− E[bj(xRPj )]
)
+ bi(ei +
∑
j∈RP
dj).(16)
where xRPj ≡ ej +wRPj−1 −wRPj for every j ∈ RP is the vector of water consumption with wRPRP .
Next, define w′QP , a vector of water releases in QP , as follow:
w′j =

wQPj if j ∈ QP \RP
wQPj − dj if j ∈ RP \i− 1
wQPj +
∑
j∈RP dj if j = i− 1
Notice that, by Lemma 1, w′QP is feasible in QP . Therefore
v(QP ∪ i)− v(QP ) ≥
∑
j∈RP
(
E[bj(x
QP
j − dj−1 + dj)]− E[bj(xQPj )]
)
+ bi(ei +
∑
j∈RP
dj).(17)
Moreover, for any j ∈ RP , since −dj−1 + dj = xRP∪ij − xRPj ≤ 0 and xQPj ≥ xRPj by Lemma 1,
by concavity of bj , bj(x
RP
j ) − bj(xRPj − dj−1 + dj) ≥ bj(xQPj ) − bj(xQPj − dj−1 + dj) for every
ej ∈ [ej , e¯j ]. Taking the expectation of the last inequality with respect ej and re-arranging
terms leads E[bj(x
QP
j − dj−1 + dj)] − E[bj(xQPj )] ≥ E[bj(xRPj − dj−1 + dj)] − E[bj(xRPj )] for
every j ∈ RP . Combining these inequalities with (16) and (17) leads to (14). The same
argument establishes (15).
Step 2. By repeated application of (14) and (15), we obtain v(RP∪QF∪i)−v(RP∪RF∪i) ≥
v(QF ∪ i)− v(RF ∪ i) and v(QP ∪QF ∪ i)− v(RP ∪QF ∪ i) ≥ v(QP ∪ i)− v(RP ∪ i). Therefore:
v(Q)− v(R)
= (v(QP ∪QF ∪ i)− v(RP ∪QF ∪ i)) + (v(RP ∪QF ∪ i)− v(RP ∪RF ∪ i))
≥ (v(QP ∪ i)− v(RP ∪ i)) + (v(QF ∪ i)− v(RF ∪ i)
≥ v(QP )− v(RP ) + v(QF )− v(RF ) = v(Q\i)− v(R\i),
where the second inequality holds again because of (14) and (15). We are done.
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B Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that a core FWSA (w∗, τ ′) with τ ′ 6= τu is sustainable to ei < E[ei] while (w∗, τu) is
not. Then, by (8), we have:
τ ′i ≥ bi(ei + w∗i−1)− bi(ei + w∗i−1 − w∗i ) > τui .
By the definition of τui in (7), the above inequality implies:
τ ′i >
∑
j∈F 0i
E
[
bj(ej + w
∗
j−1 − w∗j )
]− v(F 0i),
or, equivalently,
v(F 0i) >
∑
j∈F 0i
E
[
bj(ej + w
∗
j−1 − w∗j )
]− τ ′i . (18)
Now the ex ante welfare of country j with (w∗, τ ′) is defined by:
u′j = E
[
bj(ej + w
∗
j−1 − w∗j )
]− τ ′j−1 + τ ′j .
The total ex ante welfare of coalition F 0i = {i+ 1, ..., n} is then:∑
j∈F 0i
uj =
∑
j∈F 0i
E[bj((ej + w
∗
j−1 − w∗j )]− τ ′i .
Combined with (18), it leads to v(F 0i) >
∑
j∈F 0i uj which contradicts that (w
∗, τ ′) is a core
FWSA.
C Proof of Proposition 3
The proof of the first part of Proposition 3 is similar than the proof of Proposition 2. Suppose
that a core FWSA (w∗, τ ′) with τ ′ 6= τ d is not sustainable to ei < E[ei] while (w∗, τ d) is.
Then, by (8), we have:
τdi ≥ bi(ei + w∗i−1)− bi(ei + w∗i−1 − w∗i ) > τ ′i .
By the definition of τdi in (7), the above inequality implies:
v(Pi)−
∑
j∈Pi
E
[
bj(ej + w
∗
j−1 − w∗j )
]
> τ ′i ,
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or, equivalently,
v(Pi) >
∑
j∈Pi
E
[
bj(ej + w
∗
j−1 − w∗j )
]
+ τ ′i . (19)
The ex ante welfare of country j with (w∗, τ ′) is defined by:
u′j = E
[
bj(ej + w
∗
j−1 − w∗j )
]− τ ′j−1 + τ ′j .
The total ex ante welfare of coalition Pi = {1, ..., i} is then:∑
j∈Pi
uj =
∑
j∈Pi
E[bj((ej + w
∗
j−1 − w∗j )] + τ ′i .
Combined with (19), it yields v(Pi) >
∑
j∈Pi uj which contradicts that (w
∗, τ ′) is a core
FWSA.
For the second part of Proposition 3, first remark that, since b1(e1)−b1(e1−w∗1) is decreasing
with e1 ∈ [e1, e¯1] for every w∗1 ∈ (0, ei), b1(e1) − b1(e1 − w∗1) ≥ b1(e1) − b1(e1 − w∗1) for every
e1 ∈ [e1, e¯1] with a strict inequality for e1 > e1. The last inequalities imply b1(e1)−b1(e1−w∗1) >
E[b1(e1)− b1(e1−w∗1)]. Since, by (6), τd1 = v(1)−E[b1(e1−w∗1)] and v(1) = E[b1(e1)], it leads
to b1(e1) − b1(e1 − w∗1) > τd1 which shows that the downstream incremental FWSA is not
sustainable to reduced flow at the source for any minimal flow e1 < e¯1, that is as long as e1 is
random.
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